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JN THE SUPREME COURT JF THE STATE
OF UTAH
I. J. WAGNER and ILENE J.
WAGNER, husband and wife,
and WALLACE A. WRIGHT, JR.,
and JERALYN T. WRIGHT,
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

CASE NJ. 12618

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant - Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiffs and Appellants
for a declaratory judgment that a State statute, the
Utah Underground Conversion of Utilities Law, and an
ordinance of Salt Lake City enacted pursuant to such
statute, are each invalid and unconstitutional and for
an injunction against the Defendant from undertaking
any further proceedings in connection with Underground Conversion of Utilities District Number8-F-1A.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment
based upon the pleadings on file and a stipulation of
facts entered into between the parties. After argu-
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ment, the District Court determined that there w
as
.
no d isp~te as to any material facts, that the statute
and ordinance were constitutional and that th ·
.
.
em
1unct10n requested should be denied.

1

e

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the District
Court judgment and a holding that the statute and
ordinance involved are unconstitutional and according i
ly that the injunction prayed for should be granted.

I

ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
The 1969 regular session of the Utah Legislature
enacted in Chapter 157, Laws of Utah, 1969, a com·
prehensive statute entitled the "Utah Underground
Conversion of Utilities Law". This has been compil· .
ed in Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Sections 54-8·1
through 54-8-30, both inclusive. (This statute is som~
times ref erred to in the pleadings and in this Brief
as the "State Statute"). The Board of Commissioners~
of Salt Lake City, by ordinance passed 8ctober Zl, P
1970 which became effective on its publication on;;
November 18, 1970, adopted an ordinance whic~ ~u~
stantially re-enacts for Salt Lake City the prov1s10m;
of the State Statute. Such ordinance is found al I,
·
es oi '
Chapter 7 of Title 39 of the Revised Ordmanc :
Salt Lake City, Utah 1953. (This ordinance is so~~ i
times ref erred to in the pleadings and in this Bnef
j

I

as the "Ordinance").
eries 0f av, I,
Commencing in September of 1970, a s
5al11
tions were taken and procedures followed by
1

1
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Lake City, Utah Power and Light Company (the
"Power Company") and Mountain Bell Telephone
company (the "Telephone Company'') leading to the
establishment on February 3, 1971, of Underground
Conversion of Utilities District Number 8-F-lA (the
"Utilities District") comprising all of Lots 14 to 19,
inclusive, of Plat "C", North Hills Subdivision. Included in the Utilities District is the property owned
by Plaintiffs l.J. Wagner and Ilene J. Wagner. Immediately adjacent to the Utilities District but not
included within its boundaries is the property owned
by Plaintiffs Wallace A. Wright, Jr. and J eralyn T.
Wright. Both sets of Plaintiffs are residents of Salt
Lake City and property taxpayers.
The Utilities District was established for the purpose of removing overhead electric and telephone wires
and other facilities from the property within the
District and replacing the same with underground
electric and telephone communication facilities to serve
each of the six lots within the Utilities District. The
Power Company and the Telephone Company provide
electric and telephone service respectively, to all
properties within the Utilities District.
In accordance with the State Statute (54-8-6), the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City received
a petition signed by twcrthirds of the owners of the
real property and by the owners of not less than twcr
thirds in value of the real property within the
proposed District, and adopted a Resolution that the
proposed District would promote the public convenience, necessity and welfare. A study was provided

6

the unpaid balance of the assessments (54-8-22) bui
as yet no bonds have been issued.
!
Within the period prescribed by 54-8-23 of the Statt
Statute, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking in theu
First Count on behalf of themselves and in theu
Second Count on behalf of themselves and all other
residents and taxpayers of Salt Lake City as a class.
to obtain a declaratory judgment pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgments Act of Utah, determining that
the State Statute and the Ordinance and each of them
are invalid and unconstitutional and also seeking an;
injunction against Salt Lake City from undertakini
any further proceedings in connection with the Utili·
ties District.
From a summary judgment holding that the State
Statute and Ordinance are constitutional, this apperu
is prosecuted.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
ARE UNCONSTITUTJ'.)NAL IN TIIAT THEY
AUTH'.)RIZE PUBLIC ACTION F'.)R A PRIV ATE PURP'.)SE, LEND THE CREDIT '.)f A
MUNICIPALITY FJR A PRIVATE PURP'.)SE
AND DELEGATE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS
TO PRIVATE CORPORATIJNS.

1

Preliminary to our discussion of this point, an un·
s t Statute
derstanding of the framework of the ta e
and Ordinance is appropriate.
.
ty owners
On the petition of two-thirds of the proper
th
·ty or town, e
within a given area of a county, c1
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governing body of such municipality may form a spe-cial improvement district for the purpose of converting overhead electric and telephone communication
facilities to underground facilities. While it is clear
that the governing body can act on a petition of the
property owners (State Statute, §54-8-6; Ordinance
§39-7-6), it is possible to construe the act to permit
the governing body to act on its own initiative (see
State Statute, §54-8-4 and Ordinance, §39-7-4). At
any rate, when the initial action is taken the next
step is to refer the matter to the public utility corporations involved for a study of the feasibility of
the project and of the cost of the work to be done.
Based upon this report and not on the report of any
public official or employee, the city may then give
notice of its intention to create the improvement
district and hold a hearing at which real property
owners within the district may attend. If the owners
fail to attend and object, they waive any further objection to the creation of the district, the making of
the improvements and the inclusion of their real
property within the district (State Statute, §54-8-12;
Ordinance, § 39-7-13). After the hearing, and making
such adjustments to the size of the district as may
be appropriate, the governing body may proceed with
the creation of the district by adoption of a resolution.
The next step is the preparation of an assessment
list followed by the adoption of a resolution declaring
the entire cost of the improvement "including the
cost of construction as determined from the cost and

8

feasibility report [of the utilities]

· · · ·" The resolu.
t~on also constitutes an approval of the assessment
hst subject to adjustment by a board of equalizat·!On I
and review. Notice of the proposed assessments are
given to each of the real property owners within the
district and a hearing is held where real propertr /
owners are heard "on the question of whether hls r
property will be benefited by the proposed improvement to the amount of the proposed assessment
against his property and whether the amount assessed
against his property constitutes more than his proper 1
proportional share of the total cost of the improve- !
ment." (State Statute, §54-8-16; Ordinance, ~39-7-171. I
Assessments may be adjusted at the hearing and I
after all adjustments are made, the governing body
then levies an assessment against the property within
the district. The assessment is payable immediately
or in installments over a period of time specified in'
the assessment resolution not exceeding twentyyears.
(State Statute, ~54-8-19; Ordinance, ~39-7-21).
At this point the governing body may issue bonds
of the county, city or town involved, secured by a 1
pledge of the assessments and payable over the peri'od I
of time the assessments are payable (State Statute. :
§54-8-22; Ordinance, §39-7-24).
To this point with exceptions to be noted later..
· prov~ ·:
the legislation follows the pattern of spec1'al un
0
ment district legislation for general county, city an ·
1 01
town purposes such as paving of streets, build'ng
com·'
sidewalks curb and gutter, sewers and the 1ik e. .
'
· JatiOn
pare the State Statute with the general legis

I

I

I
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authorizing improvement districts in counties (Chapter
7 of Title 17, U. C. A. 1953) and cities and towns (Chapter 16 of Title 10, U.C.A. 1953). But an important deviation is made in that the actual work to be done
within the district is done solely by the public utilities involved rather than through competitiv.e bids let
by the municipality and supervised by public officials.
(Compare the State Statute, §54-8-25 and the Ordinance,
39-7-Z7 with ~ 17-7-16 through 17-7-20, relating to counties, and ~10-16-8 and §10-16-9 relating to cities and
towns.) Furthermore, ownership of the facilities thus
constructed is specifically made the property of the
public utility corporations and not the property of
the property owners or even of the municipality
which has created the district, levied the tax and issued the bonds (State Statute, §54-8-25; Ordinance, ~397-27). Furthermore, the costs of the work to be included in the cost and feasibility report and on which
the assessments are based must be in such an amount
that the utility corporations involved are guaranteed
a recovery out of the assessment monies of the cost
to utility corporation (less depreciation) for the overhead facilities which are being removed plus the cost
of the removal itself, any additional cost of constructing the underground facilities over the investment in
the removed facilities and the cost of obtaining new
easements if deemed necessary (State Statute ~54-8-24;
'.:>rdinance §39-7-26). In addition, the public utility
corporation is authorized to impose an additional
cost on the property owner for providing underground
service from its normal easement across the land in-

10

volved to other parts of the property and this be.
comes a part of the assessment and constitutes a
grant of easement to the utility corporation (for
which the property owner receives no compensation)
unless the property owner has made written objec.
tion to the imposition of such costs at the time of
the initial hearing on the district (See State Statute
§54-8-26; Ordinance ~39-7-28). When the work is done,
the public utility corporation presents its bill which
the municipality is commanded to pay "within thirty
days" (State Statute §54-8-27; Ordinance ~39-7-29).

I
1

1

I

A. The State Statute and Ordinance Authorize Public Action and Taxation for a Private
Purpose.
It is a fundamental principle of our law that public

I

action cannot be taken and taxes imposed for private ~
I
purposes.
For a statute or tax to be lawful, it must be enact·
ed for a valid public purpose. See 51 Am. JW"., Taxi!:
tion, § 321, p. 372; 16 Mc Quillan, Municipal Corpora·
tions, 3rd Ed. Rev., ~44.35, p. 116. The basis for this
rule was perhaps most eloquently stated by Mr. Jus·
tice Miller in Citizens Savings & Loan Assoc. v. City
of Topeka, 21 Wall. 655, 22 L. Ed. 455 (1874) where i
he discussed the constitutionality of a state statute
authorizing a direct grant of public funds and the is· :
suance of government bonds to provide funds to
donate to a private corporation. After stating the
·
ose '
rule that a tax which does not have a publlc pW'P
"was beyond the legislative power, and was an un1

1

1

!
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authorized invasion of private right", he goes on to
state:
"It must be conceded that there are such
rights in every free government beyond the
control of the State. A government which
recognized no such rights, which held the
lives, the liberty, and the property of its
citizens subject at all times to the absolute
disposition and unlimited control of even the
most democratic depository of power, is after
all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you
chose to ca 11 it so, but it is none the less a
despotism. It may well be doubted if a man
is to hold all that he is accustomed to call
his own, all in which he has placed his happiness, and the security of which is essential
to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of others, whether it is not wiser that
this power should be exercised by one man
than by many.

"The theory of our governments, State and
National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these
governments are all of limited and defined
powers.
"There are limitations on such power which
grow out of the essential nature of all free
governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact
could not exist, and which are respected by
all governments entitled to the name.
" ... To lay with one hand the power of the
government on the property of the citizen,

12
~nd. ~ith the o~her .to bestow it upon favored
individuals to aid pnvate enterprises and build
up private fortunes is none the less a robber•
?ecause it is ct.one und~r !he forms of law an~
is called taxat10n. This is not legislation. It
is a decree under legislative forms."

See also Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 26.

I

These principles have been recognized by this Court 1
See for example, Denver & Rio Grande Rwy. Co. v.
1
Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224; I'
Wicks vs. Salt Lake City, 60 Utah 265, 208 P. 538; ,
Pearson v. Salt Lake County, 9 U.2d 388, 346 P.2d 155. f
Applying this principle, it has been held that a city
cannot levy taxes and issue bonds for the construction and operation of ~ hotel (Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 2'Z7 N. Car. 283, 42 S. E. 2d. 209); a public parking garage could not be erected from tax money
(Cleveland v. Rutle, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507,
103 A.L.R. 853) and land could not be condemned for
parking lots (Barker v. Kansas City, 146 Kan. 347,
70 P. 2d. 5).
We have found no cases precisely involving conversion of overhead utility lines to underground lines to
the direct benefit of private utility corporations,
Perhaps the closest case is Fish er v. Astoria, 126
Ore. 268, 269 Pac. 857, 60 A.L.R. 260, where the Ore- I
gon Supreme Court held it was a proper public pur- 1
pose to levy assessments for ornamental lighting~ostl I
and underground wires to light streets in a business .
section of the city of Astoria. The case is distin- :
guishable because it was involved with a lighting ;

13
system for streets enjoyed by the public and furtheimore streets in a business area of the city. There
was no provision mentioned thatthe underground facilities or the ornamental lighting poles would become
the property of the private utility involved. The case
seems to assume this would be public property because the opinion points out that the improvement
did not become private in nature where only the electricity distributed was privately manufactured. The
case of Irish v. Hahn, 208 Cal. 339, 281 Pac. 385, 66
A.L.R. 1382, involved a street lighting district in
downtown Pasadena and is likewise distinguishable
because only lighting of public streets was involved
and that by a publicly owned electric distribution
system.
In this case the State Statute can be used, and
most commonly would be used, not for converting
overhead street lighting to street lighting provided
through underground wires and facilities, but primarily
for electrical and telephone service of all types to
residences and business establishments. This is the
concern of the public. While the municiaplity may be
and the utility co.rporations and is not the proper
concern of th~a~~~iii~ii~~~ ved
interested in aesthetics and perhaps might encourage
public utilities and property owners to install underground facilities rather than have overhead wires, this
is not such an interest that should permit the use of
the taxing power and the public credit for these purposes at least in the absence of consent by the owners involved.

~
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The vice of the State Statute and Ordinance is its
mandatory requirement that owners can be included
in the district without their consent. The municipality can create an improvement district even if up
to one-third of the property owners fail to sign the
petition Indeed, if we are correct that 54-8-4 authorizes the governing body to act on its own initiative
without petition from the property owners, the district
could be created and the tax imposed notwithstanding
the number or kind of objections. At least it is
apparent that the governing body can, after a petition from property owners, create the district and
impose the tax notwithstanding the number of objections. Note that the signing of the petition does not
foreclose the property owner from thereafterobjecting :
nor should it because the initial petition precedes the
cost and feasibility report and the public hearing
where information is available on which the property
owner can make an intelligent decision.
Contrast this result with the Municipal Improvement District Act where assessment districts for im·
provements to be publicly owned and to be installed
under the supervision and control of public officers
can be prevented if two-thirds of the property owners• I
file objections. 10-16-7 (3) U.C.A. 1953. Under tlns
statute, the municipality has no jurisdiction to proceed
with the district if the necessary protests are filed.
Armstrong v. Ogden City, 12 Utah 476, 43 Pac. 119;
affd 168 U.S. 224, 18 S. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444.
But both the State Statute and the 8rdinance per·
mit a district to be created and a tax imposed not·
1
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withstanding objections by a large number of the property owners affected - even though they do not
agree that their property would be beautified or enhanced by the removal of the wires - even though
they feel the cost is too high or that a tax lien on
their property is an unwise encumbrance. See Pearson v. Salt Lake County, supra (concurring opinion).
If the principal basis for justifying public action
of this type is beautification of the envirorunent,
the property owners who may have a different
aesthetic sensibility or who may wish to preserve
their pocketbooks or property rights can find their
wishes overridden by the governing body at the instance of the despotic majority of which Mr. Justic
Miller speaks.
But the State Statute goes further and authorizes
these severe results for the benefit of the public
utility corporations involved. The Power Company and
the Telephone Company in this case and similar utility corporations in other districts are guaranteed
that they will not lose anything but indeed are guaranteed that they will gain full reimbursement for the
corporations' investment in the overhead facilities, all
costs of removal thereof, all costs of constructing
underground facilities in excess of their original cost
of the overhead facilities, costs of obtaining new easements and finally, title to all of the new facilities
including a new easement for service lines extending
from the underground distribution lines to the building or facility to be served with the electric or telephone service. Furthermore, the work is done en-
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tirely as the utility corporations determine using their
own contractor. The normal protection which the
public expects of contracts let on competitive bids
is not provided for and apparently there is no authorization and certainly no requirement that public officers
(such as the City Engineer) supervise and approve
the work that is done. The work when done becomes
the property of the utilities and any title in the
municipality is expressly denied. From the point of
view of the citizens of the city within and without
the district and particularly those owners who did not
consent to the formation of the district, the public
power of taxation is being used for the private benefit of the utility corporations involved and those
owners within the district who have consented to
the tax or to the formation of the district.
B. The State Statute and Ordinance Authorizes

a Lending of Public Credit for.Private Purposes
Contrary to the Utah Consitution.
Article VI, § 31 of the Utah Constitution prohibits
the legislature from authorizing either the state or any
of its political subdivisions including counties, cities
and towns from lending its credit "in aid of any rail·
road, telegraph or other private individual or corpor·
ate enterprise or undertaking." Because the state statute and ordinance authorize the issuance of bonds to
pay the utility corporations the costs guaranteed to
them and described above, we contend that this sec·
tion of the Constitution is violated.
This Court has construed this Constitutional provision in several cases. In Lehi City v. Meiling.

I
,

I1
r

I

~
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87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, the section was held not

violated by the Metropolitan Water District Act authorization to such districts to join with other corporations to ca1Ty out its functions. There was no
lending of credit so long as the district limited its
cooperation with other corporations to securing water
for public purposes. Similarly, in Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., 1 Utah 2d. 419, 268 P. 2d. 682, and
Bair v. Layton City Corp., 6 Utah 2d. 138, 307 P.
2d. 895, municipal contracts for obtaining water and
sewer services were upheld because of the public
importance and public use of the water and sewer
facilities thus obtained.
Somewhat closer to the present situation is State
Road Commission vs. Utah Power & Light Co., 10
Utah 2d 333, 353 P. 2d. 171. There reimbursement
to utility corporations for the removal of utility facilitites necessitated by highway construction was upheld. There, however, utilities we!"e only being
reimbursed for costs incurred as a result of needed
public highways. Here the costs involved are to be
reimbursed for a private benefit, that of the property
owners and utilities involved. The public as such will
not benefit from the underground facilities for they
cannot be used as a highway is used. Only the property owner and the utility corporation will use the
facilities once they are relocated underground.
In Allen v. Tooele County, 21 U. 2d. 383, 445 P.
2d. 994, this Court upheld the validity of bonds issued
under the Utah Industrial Facilities Development Acl
There as here, the proceeds of the bonds end up dir-
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ectly or indirectly in the hands of private parties. ,
But this Court held that the constitutional provision
is not violated because the obligation to pay the
bonds was only out of the rentals paid by the private
company for the use of the facilities constructed.
It was a limited obligation of the public agency issuing the bonds and did not involve its "credit" in the
constitutional sense. Here, however, bonds are issuable by the city, county or town involved which
are apparently not limited solely to payment from a
special fund as was the situation in the Allen case.
Section 54-8-22 of the State Statute and the corresponding provision of the Ordinance, Section 39-7-24,
simply authorizes bonds to be issued to the extent
of the unpaid balance of the assessments for the per- '
iod of time over which the assessments are payable
and secured by and payable from a pledge of the assessment money. The customary prohibitions on the
collection of bonds issued from funds other than assessments is missing from the State Statute· and Ordinance. See Point II of this brief for a more extended discussion of this omission.
A further distinction from the Tooele Countycase
is the important fact that while the bonds remained
outstanding title to the property involved remained
in the public agency issuing the bonds, subject to the
lease to the private corporation. The private corporation was required to pay rental for the use of the
facilities developed with proceeds of the bonds. Here,
the title to the facilities is expressly denied to the
public agency involved. At no time does the county,

1
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city or town own or have the right to own either the
overhead facilities which are removed or the undergound facilities which are constructed. See State
Statute, ~54-8-25; Ordinance, ~39-7-27.
Finally, the effect of the statutory scheme is to
lend public credit to the private utility. But, for the
State Statute, a property owner desiring underground
facilities across his property would contract with the
utility for such service. While a public utility corporation must provide service to those who request it,
we know of no provision which requires the utility
to serve by underground facilities. Accordingly, the
property owner would have to bargain with the utility for this type of special service. Unless the property owner paid cash to cover the cost of the underground facility, the utility corporation would
use money obtained from issuance of securities,
debt obligations or from rate revenues relying on
the property owner to reimburse it for its costs over
a period of time. The State Statute and Ordinance
arrive at the same result: The property owner pays
the assessments over a period of time, but the utility
company, instead of using its own funds or funds obtained from issuance of securities or debt obligations,
uses funds obtained from the issuance of debt obligations of the municipality. The proceeds of the bonds
Will be used by the city to pay the bills submitted
by the utility companies. It is a plan to use public
credit supported by public taxes for the purpose of
financing conversion of privately owned overhead
lines to privately owned underground facilities for
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the benefit of the pn·v at e u t·1·t·
i I ies and private pr
perty owners. This is clearly a use of the ubt
. f
·
p IC
er ed it or private purposes.

C. :11e State Statute. and Ordinance Constitute ,
an U~awful Delegat10nofl\lunicipa!Functions
to Private Corporations.

1

Article YI. ~· 29 of the Utah Constitution provides
as follows:
The legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association.
any power to make, supervise or interfere
with any municipal improvement, money.
property or effects, whether held in trust or ,
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol
site, or to perform any municipal functions.
This section has been construed in numerous cases
by this Court, but always in cases involving "special
commissions" which have been claimed to interlere
with powers of local government granted to cities,
towns and counties. In Tygesen v. Magna Water Co"
119 Utah 274, 226 P. 2d 127; Lehi City v. Mei/ing,
supra; Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 U. 2d 412, 37v
P. 2d 756; Carter v. Beaver County, 16 U. 2d 280, 399
P. 2d 440 and County Water System v. Salt Lake City,
3 U. 2d 46, 278 P. 2d 285, the Court was concerned
with state statutes authorizing the creation of various
types of special public agencies or political subdivisions.
There are no Utah cases involving the delegationto I
a strictly private corporation such as is here involve~,
perhaps because it is so obviously contrary to tlns
provision of the Constitution.
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The c:ases, however, do indicate clearly that the
purpose of the Constitutional provision is to preserve
local self-government to cities, towns and counties
with respect to its proper municipal functions. See
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah
536, 271 Pac. 961 at 972. In Backman v. Salt Lake
County, supra., this court stated as follows:
"Three conditions are necessary to violate this
provision: (1) delegation to a private commission of power to (2) interfere with municipal
property or (3) to perform a municipal function."
That there is a delegation involved in the State Statute and Ordinance seems plain for the utility corporations are involved from the beginning with their cost
and feasibility report. If the project is continued beyond that stage, the utility corporations take over
the construction of the new improvements and the
removal of the old overhead wire. The public agency
is not involved even in a supervisory capacity as
pointed out above. The public agency whose duty
it is to protect the citizens of the city, including the
property owners within the district, from the abuse
of public credit and improper expenditure of tax funds
must stand aside while the utility corporation hires
its own contractor at such cost as the utility corporation thinks is proper and then passes this cost on to
the property owners.
There is no "municipal property" involved which
is interfered with in violation of this section because
as we have pointed out above, title to all of the
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have an unusual omission. The bonds may. be 1ssuea
·
for the unpaid balance of the assessments levied ana
for the period of time over which the assessments are
payable. Otherwise, they are in such form as the is.
suer determines. While it is true that the State Sta.
tute in ~ 54-8-22 and Jrdinance in ~ 39-7-24 provides
that the bonds "shall be secured by and payable from
the irrevocable pledge and dedication of the fund~
derived from the levy and collection of the special
assessments in anticipation of the collection of which
they are issued", there is nothing that limits the
•
bondholder to the assessment morues as the sole
source of payment, nor is the issuer prohibited from
obligating the full faith and credit of the municipality.
Compare these provisions with the statute authorizing
assessment bonds in cities and towns, ~10-16-:?7 and
10-16-29, U.C. A. 1953.
~10-16-27 provides for the is·
suance of "special improvement bonds to pay the
costs of the improvements in the district against the
f uruis created by the assessment." The latter section
specifically states that such bonds "are not a general obligation of the municipality" and then goes
on to make this fact certain by stating "no munici·
pality shall be held liable for the payment of any
special improvement bond except to the exten~ of
the funds created and received by assessments agamst
which the bonds are issued and to the extent of i~
" Under
special improvement guaranty fund . . . ·
such provisions it is plain that any bond issued
must be limited in payment to the special fund crea~

.
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ed by the assessment and accordingly no "debt" in
the constitutional sense is involved. Here, however,
the State Statute does not provide that assurance
and thus debts will or may be created with no election having been held and without regard to the
constitutional debt limits. The taxpayers throughout the city could conceivably be taxed to pay a
defaulted bond. The risk of this should not be tolerated and the State Statute and Ordinance should be
declared unconstitutional.
POINT III
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
UNCONSTITUTIJNALLY DENY DUE PROCESS JF LAW
The State Statute and Ordinance have the appearance of affording ample due process in the procedural
sense by the series of notices and hearings required.
However, hearings which are merely an empty formality and where no real determinations of the merit
of objections are considered, does not constitute due
process of law.
The initial hearing is perhaps the most important
because, at this time, a determination is made to
create the district or to make changes in the original
proposal with respect to the size of the district. Here
the law is deficient in two respects.
First, there is no provision setting forth the time
prior to the hearing when the mailed, published and
posted notices must be given. The State Statute in
54-8-10 simply provides that the notice be published
''one time" in a newspaper of general circulation in
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the district or of general circulation in the count
city or town in which the district is located. WhJ~
posting and mailing is also required, there is nc
time specified prior to the hearing within which these
actions must be completed. For all that appears
from the statute, notice could be given the day of the
hearing or what might be just as defective, several
months prior to the hearing. Procedural due process
seems to demand that notice be given a reasonable
time prior to the hearing, but not an unreasonably
long time prior to the hearing. Commonly, statutes
of this type set forth these requirements. See for
example, 10-16-6, U.C.A. 1953 where publication is
required once during each week for four successive
weeks with the last publication "to be at least five
days and not more than twenty days prior to the
time fixed in the notice as the last day for the filing
of protests." See also, 11-14-3, U.C.A. 1953, relating ,
to notices of bond elections. Without standards as
to time provided by the law, arbitrary action and proceeding without a notice that is in fact adequate, is
permitted.
That this is a vital requirement is
emphasized by the provisions of the State Statute
in ~ 54-8-12 and the corresponding provision of the
Ordinance, ~39-7-13 that real property owners who
fail to appear at the hearing and make object:on
··shall be deemed to have waived every such obiec·
tion."
.
held seems
Jn the second place, the hearing once
to be merely a perfunctory matter and too much de.
f th public uti·
pendent on the reports and actions o
e

lity corporations. ~54-8-11 of the State Statute (Ordinance, 039-7-12) states that representatives of the utility
corporations "shall be present at all such hearings."
'.)newonders if the county or city commission or town
board has the right or jurisdiction to proceed if the
power company and telephone company representative fails to appear. Even if the governing body decides to make a change in the proposed improvements
or the proposed district which "appear" to affect the
feasibility or cos tof the improvements proposed (which
determination can be made only after consultation
with the utilities), then the same sections, in mandatory language, require that the hearing be adjourned
until a new cost and feasibility report can be prepared by the utilities.
The fundamental problem, however, is the cost and
feasibility report itself. As previously noted, the cost
formula of ~ 54-8-24 is a rigid one designed to guarantee to the utility full reimbursement of its investment
plus costs of the changed facilities. It is not desiE;ned to minimize costs to the property owner. Indeed,
since there is no assurance of the lowest cost by competitive bids and because the utility is permitted to
{klSs on to the property owners all costs, whatever
they may be, there is really no incentive to the utility
to minimize costs. There is no real opportunity for
the property owners or for the governing body of the
municipality involved to inquire into the basis of the
costs. ln effect, the choice is accept the cost and feasibility report of the utility or discontinue all work
in the district. '111is is not really changed by the pro-
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visions of 54-8-11 permitting the governing body to
make changes in the district or in the improvem1::nts
because this must be followed by a new cost and fea.
sibility report from the utility. That the utility corporation will tend to be generous in its estimates of
cost seems assured by the provisions of ~ 54-8-27
(Ordinance, §39-7-29) which limits the utilityreimbursement for cost to not more than its original estimate.
All of these factors separately, and certainly taken
together, constitute a denial of due process in fact
even though appearances of fairness are maintained.
POINT IV
THE METIIOD OF ASSESSMENT CONSTITUTES A DENIAL JF DUE PROCESS AND
THE EQUAL PROTECT! JN OF THE LAWS
The guiding principle and the theory justifying the
imposition of special assessments is. benefit to the
property owner from the improvements for which
the assessment is made and a proper apportionment
of that benefit among all property owners affected
by the making of the improvement. A leading text
writer has stated the rules as follows:
"Assessments, as distinguished from other
kinds of taxation, are those special and l?cal
impositions upon the property in the im~ediate
vicinity of municipal improvements, which are
necessary to pay for the improvem~nts, and
are made with reference to the special ben&
fit which the property is supposed to .h~ve
derived therefrom." ( McQuillen, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Edition Revised, Vol. 14,

§38.01).
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··special assessment or special taxation, therefore, is lawful and constitutional only when
founded upon special benefits accrued from
the improvement for which the tax or assessment is laid. In other words, the test in all
special taxation or assessment proceedings
which is constantly invoked by the courts, is
that the assessment should not exceed the
special benefit to the property." (Op. cit.,
~38.02).

"To be valid and constitutional the special
assessment or tax must be fairly within the
limits of the benefits conferred, and just
and uniform throughout the assessment, the
benefit or taxing district, or applicable alike
to those compelled to pay who are similarly
situated." (Op. cit.,§38.05).
The leading case on the subject is Norwood v. Baker,
172 U.S. 269, 19 S. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443. See also
French v. Barber Asphal.t Paving Company, 181 U.S.
324, 21 S. Ct. 625, 45 L. Ed. 879; Louisville and Nashville Railway Company v. Barber Asphalt Paving
Company, 197 U.S. 430, 25 S. Ct. 466, 49 L. Ed. 819.
In Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240
U.S. 55, 36 S. Ct. 254, 60 L. Ed. 523, the United States
Supreme Court stated, ". . .if the law is of such a
character that there is no reasonable presumption
that substantial justice generally will be done, but
the probability is that the parties will be taxed disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred, the law cannot stand .... "
The State Statute recognizes, as it must, the principle of benefit as being the basis for the assessments
to be levied in the improvement district created under
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the act.

(See State Statute, ~ 54-8-5, 54_8_15 , __rn
54 8
54-8-17). However, the State Statute is deficient i~
two
respects and fails to comply with the co ns t'l!u.
.
t10nal principles applicable to such taxation.
First, the basis for the assessment is the square
footage of the lots within the district. § 54-8-5 provides in part, "Each lot and parcel of the land shall I
be separately assessed for the cost and expenses 1
thereof in proportion to the number of square feel i
of such lands and lots abutting, adjoining, conti- /
guous and adjacent thereto or included in the improvement district, and in proportion to the benefits
derived to such property by said improvements.''
Other methods of determining benefits and apportion- r
ing costs are not authorized. Apportionment, accord- '
ing to frontage or the length of the distribution lines .
within the particular property or according to assessed
I
valuation of the property or according to the service ,
supplied through the facilities, is not authorized. i
Square footage is the sole method permitted and this !
can lead to inequitable results. The owner of
a smaller lot than his neighbors, although receiving
exactly the same electric and telephone service, would
be assessed a smaller amount. A property owner
who uses large amounts of electric or telephone ser·
vice would pay the same as his neighbor whose needs
1
are smaller simply because the size of their lots are
the same or similar.
The method of assessment
thus becomes arbitrary by its very mechanical~~
.
plication. It cannot be said
to eqm"t ably apportion '
·
gnitiono!
benefits. In contrast, and no doubt m reco
1

I
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the many problems involved in apportioning special
assessments fairly, the Municipal Improvement District Act authorizes assessments according to frontage,
according to area, according to assessed valuation or
by any combination of such methods. See 10-16-16
U.C.A. 1953. Note also, that the requirement that
assessments must be equal and uniform according
to the benefits received as stated in §10-16-16 is missing from the State Statute and Ordinance in question
here.
A second problem with the State Statute and )rdinance is the failure to recognize the benefit to the
public utility corporations involved by either apportioning a part of the cost to the utility corporations
or permitting assessments on them. The statutory
scheme is designed to guarantee return to the utilities of all of their costs and it is only the property
owners within the district that are assessed. It is
obvious that underground facilities do benefit the
utilities. Falling wires due to wind, ice, falling trees
and the like are avoided. Transformers are placed on
or below the ground and danger of lightning damage
to such equipment is lessened. Maintenance is made
easier and very likely less expensive because it can
be conducted from ground level. Expensive equipment to elevate men and facilities on poles and wires
is no longer needed. Injury to personnel from falls
is minimized. Weathering of wires and other equipment is virtually eliminated.
Undoubtedly, there
are other utility company benefits from underground
facilities. However, the State Statute and Ordinance
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recognize none of these benefits and apportio
··
n to
th e u t1·11hes
none of the costs of the impro
.
. .
vemen~
m recogmt1on of these benefits. Instead ·t ·
, 1 1s as.
sumed that all benefits are received by the property
owners within the district.

1

By failing to apportion assessments fairly and uni. t
formly and by failing to take into account the benefits to all persons ··affected or benefited" by the
improvements, the State Statute and Drdinance are /1
contrary to principles of due process and unifonn
operation of the laws and deny to property owners i
within the district the equal protection of the laws. !
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 24; /1
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
POINTV
THE STATE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
PERMIT THE TAKING OFPROPERTYWITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.

I

Fundamental to our society is the principle that I
I
property of citizens cannot be taken for use by others
without just compensation. Utah Constitution, Article
I, Section 22. Portions of the State Statute and Jr·
dinance permit and even require that property be
taken without any provision being made for compen- ,
sation to the property owners for the taking.
1
Consider first the fact that the utility easement I
. .
.
f or poI es and over·
which was origmally
estabhshed
.
head wires and lines is converted mto
an under-'·
ground easement over such property. Ev en if the UJJrt
derground facilities traverse the same area of prope 1
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as the overhead wires formerly occupied or are contained within the vertical limit.s of the utility easement commonly established at the time subdivisions
are created or when the first utility service is supplied, there is still such a substantial change resulting from the conversion to underground that in effect, a new easement is created. What was formerly
wires strung across a backyard under which trees and
flowers could be planted, fences placed, sprinkling systems installed, out buildings erected and other improvements made, now becomes a dedication to the use
by the utilities of a portion of the ground itself.
Surely it was not within the contemplation of the
property owner who may have granted an original
easement for overhead lines that a subsequent conversion to underground would permit the tearing up
of a fence, the destruction of trees and shrubs, the
interference with his gardening activities and the like.
It is apparent that this drastic a change constitutes
a new and different property interest.
No provision is made for compensation to the property owner except "when technical considerations
make it reasonably necessary to utilize easements for
the underground facilities different from those used
for aboveground facilities, or where the pre-existing
easements are insufficient for the underground facilities," (State Statute, §54-8-24; ::lrdinance, §39-7-26).
Even if it is necessary to obtain such a "new" easement, its cost becomes one of the costs of making
the improvement for which the utility company is
reimbursed. This is a reverse twist on normal prin-

I
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ciples of eminent domain because these same
(
costs
are apportioned back to the property owner from f
whom the easement is obtained. Not only does he I
lose a portion of his property, but in effect he must
pay himself for this loss.
r
The second failure of the State Stature and Ordinance in this regard involves the easement for the
service lines from the residence or building on the
property to the underground lines serving the neighborhood. Here the State Statute and Ordinance go
one step further because the easement for such service lines is obtained not only without compensation,
but also without any written grant or authorization
from the property owner. See ~ 54-8-26 of the State
Statute and ~ 39-7-28 of the Ordinance. There it is
provided that the simple failure by the property owner to file "written objection" is considered as the
owner's consent and grant of easement to the utility.
This same failure to act is also treated as authority
to the utility to trespass on the property owner's
land. (It should be noted also that notice to the property owner of his right to make such an objection
is not required to be stated in the notice of intention for the creation of the district). Even if the
objection is filed, its only effect appears to beto
avoid inclusion of the costs in the special assessment
The costs must still be paid because the State Statute
provides that the owner becomes responsible fordoing
the work himself and "shall be billed" by the utili~y
for whatever work the utility company does on his '
nclusion
property. There appears to be no oth er Co
1
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but that the substance and effect of these provisions
is to permit the utility companies to take private property without payment of just compensation therefor.
CONCLUSION
The State Statute and Ordinance should be held
unconstitutional for the reasons noted. These laws
are too heavily laced with private interest to withstand judicial scrutiny. While permitting private property owners and utility companiestofinanceimprovements to their property, the slight public benefit
does not justify public action for this purpose nor
the use of mandatory powers to force improvements
on unwilling property owners. This also adversely
affects taxpayers throughout the city, town or county.
If the public credit and the tax power can be used
for the benefit of a few, it is that much less available for the benefit of the public at large. ·when one
also considers that the utility companies largely determine the manner in which these powers are used,
the constitutional infirmities of the law become apparent.
For the reasons stated in this brief, the decision
below should be reversed, with instructions to enter
judgment declaring the State Statute and Jrdinance
unconstitutional and for an injunction against the
taking of further proceedings in the improvement district involved in this case.
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